
The Safe State: Design Patterns and Degradation Mechanisms for Fail-Operational Systems



Alexander Much 2015-11-11

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www.safetronic-congress.com



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Agenda

- About EB Automotive
- Motivation
- Comparison of different architectures
- Concept for an 1002D software systems
- Summary



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EB: Software and Services



Infotainment

Connected navigation software

- HMI tools for in-dash, digital instrument clusters and head-up displays
- Global software integration and engineering services

In-Car Infrastructure

- EB tresos integrated software and tools, based on AUTOSAR standards
- Solutions for: operating systems, middleware, dependable communication
- Solutions for high integrity systems: reliability, functional safety and security
- Test & simulation

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Driver Assistance

- Software development for driver assistance functions
- Electronic horizon and test drive recording solutions
- Driver assistance algorithms and functions

Connected

- Connected experiences around urbanization and electrification
- Online diagnostics
- Software and content updates

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
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The Safe State: Design Patterns and Mechanisms for Fail-Operational Systems

Current Automotive Systems are Fail-Safe

Failure Detected?


- Deactivate / degrade function
 → Safe State
- Inform the driver
- Report a diagnostic error

Standard approach in many safety relevant systems:

- Airbag, ESP, air conditioning, battery charging, ...
- Driver assistant functions such as adaptive cruise control, lane assist, ...

Some functions provide a degraded mode, sometimes limited in time:

- Electronic Power Steering
- Braking









Levels of Autonomous Driving (AD)


ΔUTOSAR degree of automation **Driver** Conditional Auto-Driver Partial High Full Assisted automation automation only automation automation mation 2 3 0 5 4 SAE 2 I 3 4 0 NHTSA 1.1 driver in the loop yes (required) not required time to take control several ~ 1s couple of minutes back seconds other activities not allowed all (even sleeping) specific while driving FCW, ACC, Traffic Jam Highway examples Valet Parking Robot car LDW LKA Chauffeur Assistant FCW ... Forward Collosion Warning ACC... Adaptive Cruise Control Source: SAE, NHTSA, VDA LDW ... Lane Departure Warning LKA ... Lane Keeping Assistant

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ΔUTOSAR

Goal: Autonomous driving



Safe State could mean:

- Continue driving until driver is in the loop
 - approx. 7-15s for conditional autonomous driving
 - Several minutes for high and full autonomous driving
 - **Precondition**: driver monitoring including a black-box
- Perform an autonomous "safe-stop" (stand-still at a non-hazardous place)
 - Main issue is to get the driver attention focused on the situation
 - Several minutes, depending on the situation
 - **Precondition**: legal acceptance, approved and certified black-box

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





2 channels with comparison

Redundant ECUs calculate using redundant data, output is compared.

A 2 channels with comparison system is fail-safe since you cannot distinguish between "ECU1 not ok" and "ECU2 not ok".








ΔUTΟSAF



2003 Systems



Three redundant ECUs calculate on redundant data, output data is voted upon

If one of the ECUs fails the system can continue with the remaining two ECUs.

Failures in the input data can be detected by an "Input-Voter".

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2003 Systems and the Automotive Domain

Applicable for automotive?

- More ECUs
- More wiring
- More weight
- More power consumption
- Higher complexity to manage

Will we as a customer accept that?

- Different opinions and market studies
- Referring to several studies, customer will pay 1500 3000€ more for autonomous driving car (mid-size car).

Source: KPMG(2013), autelligence (2015)








2003: An Example (Nissan Steer-by-Wire)

ASIL ISO 26262 88

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Source: http://www.caranddriver.com/features/electric-feel-nissan-digitizes-steering-but-the-wheel-remains-feature

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
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1002D Systems





If an ECU fails in one of the two channels, the system does not shut down but continues to operate with only one channel **The best policy is not to operate on a single channel for a "long" period of time.**

Controlling this time and matching it with complete system behavior is the key.

Precondition: very high diagnostic coverage needed for each ECU to detect failures.



From Detection to Prevention

Integrity mechanisms:


- Memory partitioning
- Data protection
- Temporal protection

Software Engineering:

- Plausibility checks
- Functional monitoring
- Defensive programming
- Semantic analysis
- Robustness

Car Infrastructure:


- Fault tolerant Ethernet
- Service orientated communication



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






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non-

critical

1002D – 1 channel 2626 1002D system ECU3 ECU1 EC Func4 Func Func5 Func1 unc1 Func6 Func3 Funcs Func3 Func1 Diagnostics Diagnostics Fault tolerant Ethernet Sensors /Actuators disabled critical


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
1002D* Func

Requirements for Reconfiguration

- Req. 1: Functions can be dynamically relocated
- Req. 2: Sensor/Actuators are redundant or accessible via network

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Dynamic Re-Configuration

Req. 1: Functions can be dynamically relocated

- Application information based on AUTOSAR xml description available
- Runtime environment (RTE) supporting reconfigurable software components
- Threads can restarted with e.g. Safety OS

OS App1 OS App2 Data Data Task3 Task1 Task2 ISR1 Data Data Data Data Stack Stack Stack Stack **OS** Data Stack

Req. 2: Sensor/Actuators are redundant or accessible via network

- Service orientated communication
- Multi-cast fault-tolerant Ethernet



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
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The Safe State: Design Patterns and Mechanisms for Fail-Operational Systems

Summary

- Re-use of available integrity mechanisms from fail-safe systems is the basis for building fail-operational systems.
- Software systems that are designed to achieve a high diagnostic coverage are available today and can be extended to fail-operational.
- Fault tolerant Automotive Ethernet is available today.
- Established concepts for fail-operational system are available and can be reused in automotive systems with budget constraints.

Let's build the next generation software systems for autonomous driving!









Contact us!



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